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INTRODUCTION 
The Massachusetts v. EPA1 decision, which opened the 
door to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
greenhouse gas2 (“GHG”) emissions regulation under the 
Clean Air Act3 (“CAA”), was one of the first significant steps 
in the United States toward recognizing the effects of climate 
change.  Although the EPA has made some progress toward 
reducing GHG emissions,4 the anticipated consequences of 
climate change, including “drought, increasingly severe 
weather events, and rising sea levels,”5 provide strong 
incentives for states to supplement the EPA’s efforts.  
Climate change will have a tangible, economic impact, 
including damage from increased storms, erosion and 
flooding,6 as well as decreased water supplies and crop 
yields.7  Such effects are seemingly consistent with the EPA’s 
determination that climate change endangers “public 
welfare,” as defined in the CAA.8  Upon considering the CAA’s 
corresponding constraints, however, the necessity of state 
action in tangent with federal regulation to substantially 
mitigate GHG emissions becomes apparent.9 
 
 1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that greenhouse 
gases qualified as an “air pollutant” for purposes of the Clean Air Act and that 
the EPA was therefore required to determine whether emissions should be 
regulated or clarify their reason for refusing to do so). 
 2. The term “greenhouse gases” generally includes carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases.  Overview of Greenhouse Gases, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last updated Apr. 
15, 2014). 
 3. Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671. 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. Coal for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012), rev’d in part, sub nom. Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (“UARG”), 
No. 12–1146, 2014 WL 2807314, at *1 (U.S. June 23, 2014). 
 6. Climate Impacts on Coastal Areas, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/coasts.html (last updated 
August 28, 2014). 
 7. Climate Impacts on Agriculture and Food Supply, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-
adaptation/agriculture.html (last updated August 28, 2014). 
 8. See Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2012) (“[E]ffects on 
welfare include[], but [are] not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, 
vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and 
climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, 
as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-
being . . . .”). 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
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Despite the differing global warming consequences facing 
states, the CAA does not expand states’ power to 
independently mitigate climate change.  While states retain 
some ability to regulate in a manner consistent with the 
EPA’s regulations, doing so can subject them to litigation and 
a competitive disadvantage.10  Although developments in 
renewable power have made states less dependent on fossil 
fuels, which are primary sources of carbon dioxide, relying 
exclusively on renewable energy is unworkable in light of 
technological, infrastructure, and economic limitations.11  
While emissions reductions can be achieved at state and local 
levels,12 the effects will likely be too piecemeal to sustain the 
progress necessary to avoid unsustainable temperature rise.13  
Obtaining substantial reductions in national GHG emissions 
requires a system that provides additional support to state-
level GHG reduction policies and prevents other states from 
undermining those reductions.  As the federal government is 
unlikely to pass legislation creating a national cap and trade 
system, a multijurisdictional program administered by states 
is necessary to produce change substantial enough to 
effectively reduce national exacerbation of climate change. 
This Comment first examines the basis for GHG 
emissions reduction regulation and the contemporary federal 
 
 10. See infra Part II.D. 
 11. See Rebecca Smith, California Girds for Electricity Woes, WALL ST. J.L. 
(Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323699704578328581251
122150 (noting that while states are investing in renewable energy sources to 
meet their growing needs for electricity, the unreliable nature of some of these 
sources will likely require coal-fueled power plants, which will likely bear the 
brunt of GHG regulation, to continue operating). 
 12. For example, significant reductions in Los Angeles’s emissions (51.6 
million metric tons of CO2 in 2004), City Carbon Index: Los Angeles, GLOBAL 
GREEN USA, http://www.globalgreen.org/articles/global/67 (last visited June 21, 
2014), could produce a substantial overall impact, as its climate footprint 
exceeds Norway’s (50.94 million metric tons of CO2 in 2004), See City Carbon 
Index: Los Angeles, GLOBAL GREEN USA, 
http://www.globalgreen.org/articles/global/67 (last visited June 21, 2014); 
Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, 
http://cait2.wri.org/wri/ (last visited June 21, 2014). 
 13. See OTTMAR EDENHOFER ET AL., IPCC, 2014: SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 9 (2014) (“Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions 
beyond those in place today, emissions growth is expected to persist driven by 
growth in global population and economic activities. Baseline scenarios, those 
without additional mitigation, result in global mean surface temperature 
increases in 2100 from 3.7 to 4.8°C compared to pre-industrial levels . . . .”). 
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and state regulatory schemes.14  Those programs have not 
effectively reduced domestic GHG emissions for numerous 
reasons, including partisanship,15 suits against the EPA,16 
limitations on both EPA and state authority to regulate GHG 
emissions under the CAA,17 and separation of powers 
concerns.18  A state-lead multilateral cap and trade program 
including states with the highest GHG emissions would be a 
feasible solution to these issues because the EPA’s policies 
are aligned with such a program;19 regional cap and trade 
programs are already in use and capable of linkage;20 and the 
incentives of such a program could persuade other states to 
join.21 
I. BACKGROUND: COOPERATIVE FEDERALIST GHG 
REGULATION 
A. EPA GHG Emissions Regulation 
The CAA requires the EPA to regulate the emission of air 
pollutants that are reasonably anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.22  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held 
that greenhouse gases met the Clean Air Act’s air pollutants 
definition, requiring the EPA to either determine whether 
GHGs posed a risk to public health or welfare, or provide a 
legitimate reason for refusing to reach such findings.23  The 
EPA subsequently issued a finding that GHGs,24 by changing 
the Earth’s climate, endangered public welfare and 
announced the “Tailpipe Rule,” confirming that vehicle GHG 
emissions would be regulated.25  This chain of events 
 
 14. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.C–D.1. 
 18. See infra Part II.D.2–3. 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Part III.B. 
 21. See infra Part III.C. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)(1998). 
 23. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35. 
 24. The GHG compounds listed as air pollutants included a combination of 
“well mixed” gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride.  Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air 
Act, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/petitions/decision.html 
(dated July 29, 2010). 
 25. Id. 
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heralded the beginning of the EPA’s efforts to regulate GHG 
emissions from stationary sources. 
By interpreting air pollutant regulation pursuant to an 
endangerment finding and thereby automatically triggering 
the CAA’s Prevention of Serious Deterioration (“PSD”) 
provision,26 the EPA essentially determined that the Tailpipe 
Rule required stationary GHG emission sources regulated 
under that provision.27  The PSD requires facilities to obtain a 
permit before constructing or modifying a “major emitting 
facility”—emitting over 250 tons per year28 (“tpy”) or 100 tpy29 
of regulated air pollutants—depending on the type of facility.  
Applying the 100 tpy threshold to GHGs, however, would 
cause an enormous increase in the volume of PSD-regulated 
sources,30 requiring permitting authorities to hire an 
additional 230,000 full-time staff and incurring exponentially 
higher costs.31  Since literally applying the PSD to GHG 
emitters would bring “millions of new sources” within its 
scope, the EPA increased the PSD threshold to 100,000 tpy 
for construction and 75,000 tpy for modification of a major 
emitting source.32  This decision, the “Tailoring Rule,” 
substantially reduced the scope of major GHG-emitting 
sources, thereby making regulation of the remaining sources 
under the PSD more feasible.33  The U.S. Supreme Court 
subsequently determined in Utilities Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA that the Tailoring Rule exceeded the EPA’s authority, 
 
 26. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine 
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs (“Timing Rule”), 75 
Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
 27. Id. at 17,019. 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Coalition, 684 F.3d at 144 (stating that “if the Title V 100 tpy threshold 
applied immediately to greenhouse gases, sources needing operating permits 
would jump from 14,700 per year to 6.1 million per year.”). 
 31. Id.  The program would “face over $21 billion in additional permitting 
costs each year due to [greenhouse gases], compared to the current program cost 
of $62 million each year.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (“Tailoring 
Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,563 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
52, 70, and 71)). 
 32. Zeroing in on EPA Authority over Stationary Sources, LAW 360, (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/483582/zeroing-in-on-epa-authority-over-
stationary-sources. 
 33. Coalition, 684 F.3d at 116.  The Tailoring Rule requires PSD permits 
only for sources emitting “over 100/250 tpy of actual pollutants, in addition to 
exceeding the 75,000/100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent.”  Id. 
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but preserved the EPA’s ability to regulate GHG emissions 
from would-be major emitters of other pollutants regulated 
under the PSD.34 
B. State GHG Emissions Regulation 
1. Combining Comprehensive Regulation with Cap and 
Trade 
Some states are already attempting to substantially 
reduce GHG emissions by combining traditional regulation 
with market-driven programs.  For example, California’s 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“AB 32”) required the 
California Air Resource Board (“CARB”) to attain a specific 
emissions-reduction target through various measures, 
including development of “early action” GHG emissions 
reduction measures and a “scoping plan” to identify the most 
feasible and cost-effective mechanisms to reduce GHG 
emissions.35  By mandating that the issues of duplicative 
efforts and conflict with similar programs be taken into 
account before implementing regulations, the scoping plan 
helps focus regulatory efforts on achieving genuinely new 
emissions reductions.36  AB 32 ensures that regulatory 
development continues by requiring CARB to “update its plan 
for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-
effective reductions of greenhouse gas emissions at least once 
every five years.”37  The Act also grants CARB the power to 
enjoin or penalize violations.38 AB 32’s approach therefore 
provides tools for California to pursue its own climate change 
mitigation policies. 
Pursuing a multi-pronged regulatory approach to 
reducing emissions would help states achieve significant 
GHG reductions.  For instance, California began building a 
framework for GHG regulation by starting with emissions 
reductions tailored by source.39  AB 32 also instituted a cap 
 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
 35. See generally California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. 
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, Div. 25.5, Pt. 4 (West 2014). 
 36. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38561(a), (c) (West 2014). 
 37. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38561(h) (West 2014). 
 38. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38580 (West 2014). 
 39. For example, CARB’s Early Action GHG Reduction Measures created a 
low carbon fuel standard and regulated methane emissions from landfills, 
hydrofluorocarbon emissions from automobile air conditioning, semiconductor 
emissions, sulfur hexafluoride reductions from non-electric and non-
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and trade program, which incorporated the sources of eighty-
five percent of California’s GHG emissions.40  The program 
uses a phased approach, applying first to electric utilities and 
large industrial facilities and then to fuel producers.41  In 
2011, the ARB set the program cap, or maximum emissions 
permitted, at two percent below California’s 2012 emissions 
forecast, and required annual reductions in the cap by two 
percent in 2014 and three percent between 2015 and 2020.42  
Sources could use U.S. emissions-reducing project offsets for 
up to eight percent of their compliance obligation.43  
Annually, included facilities are required to “provide 
allowances and offsets for thirty percent of previous year’s 
emissions . . . .”44  Failing to meet that requirement or 
missing the deadline incurs a penalty of “four allowances . . . 
for every ton of emissions that was not covered in time . . . .”45  
While electric utilities and large industrial facilities both 
initially received free allowances, industrial facilities would 
later have to pay for their allowances while publicly owned 
electric utilities would continue to receive free allowances, 
“with value of allowances to benefit ratepayers[.]”46 
It is unclear what effects the policies implemented in 
California’s cap and trade program will have on power 
consumption.  While the free utility allowances lessen the 
possibility of price increases burdening the consumer, they 
also relieve pressure on the electricity generation sector to 
improve production efficiency and reduce consumption.  Since 
electric power generation and the industrial sector emit 
similar amounts of CO2-equivalent (“CO2e”) GHGs,47 
 
semiconductor applications, GHGs emitting in producing consumer products, 
emissions measures for heavy trucks and ships at shore, and tire inflation.  See 
Early Action Items, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR 
RESOURCES BOARD (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccea/ccea.htm; see 
also infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the low carbon fuel standard). 
 40. Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program (“ARB Trading 
Program”), CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES 
BOARD (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade_overview.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Eligible projects were initially limited to “forestry, urban forestry, diary 
digesters, and destruction of ozone-depleting substances.”  Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. ARB Trading Program, supra note 42. 
 47. In 2011, electric power emitted 86.6 million tons of CO2e while the 
industrial sector emitted approximately 94 million tons.  California Greenhouse 
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subsidizing allowances appears counter-productive to the goal 
of decreasing overall emissions.  However, large price 
increases would likely cause consumer dissatisfaction and 
possibly provoke political backlash.48  Instead, California 
chose to partially reimburse consumers for increased costs 
through a “climate credit” incorporated into their electric 
utility bills.49  Current consumption-friendly U.S. energy 
policy makes it unlikely that electricity production and 
industrial facilities will be held to equivalent standards in 
future cap and trade developments.50  As the market becomes 
more established, the effects of providing free allowances can 
be further analyzed to determine whether subsidizing 
electricity allowances is ultimately an effective strategy. 
California’s cap and trade system has withstood 
numerous legal challenges,51 which in turn helped established 
precedent for a more widely-linked system.  While states may 
achieve substantial GHG emissions reductions by regulating 
activity taking place solely within their borders, various 
constraints prevent them from improving mitigation efforts 
beyond those borders.52  Pursuing a similar regulatory 
approach in tangent with a cap and trade program linked 
with other states’ carbon markets, however, provides 
additional opportunities to make more substantial reductions. 
 
Gas Emissions for 2000 to 2011–Trends of Emissions and Other Indicators, 
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD 
(2013). 
 48. See Jeff Gerth, Regulators Struggle With a Marketplace Created by 
Enron, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 10, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/10/business/regulators-struggle-with-a-
marketplace-created-by-
enron.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%222%22%3A
%22RI%3A15%22%7D (discussing the regulatory consequences of Enron’s 
alleged manipulation of energy prices). 
 49. See California Climate Credit – FAQ, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/capandtrade/climatecreditfaq.htm (last 
modified Oct. 1, 2014). 
 50. See Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy 
Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 375 (1990) (noting that U.S. energy policy 
focuses on abundant supply and low prices). 
 51. Graham Noyes, Allison C. Smith & Parissa Ebrahimzadeh, Calif. Cap 
and Trade Still Under Fire, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/492883/calif-cap-and-trade-still-under-fire 
(discussing prior legal challenges). 
 52. See infra Part III.D.2. 
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2. Multilateral Cap and Trade Programs 
A national cap and trade program could successfully be 
developed based on existing multilateral frameworks, with 
certain adjustments based on the successes and failures of 
current programs.  Several large companies have 
incorporated the cost of complying with cap and trade into 
their economic projections,53 indicating that broad-scale 
compliance is possible. 
Legislative adoption of a national cap and trade program 
is both unlikely and unnecessary, as it could preempt similar 
programs at the state level, furthering the potential for 
additional legal battles between federal and state entities.54  
Instead, states should form a broad, multilateral cap and 
trade program, linking their markets together to provide 
market stability and prevent leakage, while retaining the 
same flexibility to implement independent GHG reduction 
policies. 
Nine states in the eastern U.S. participate in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”)—one of the first 
collaborative domestic cap and trade programs.55  
Participating states have developed a linked carbon market to 
achieve a ten percent reduction below 2009 power sector CO2 
emissions by the end of 2018.56  The budget-trading program 
apportions the regional base annual CO2 emissions cap to 
each state, allowing the state to “issue CO2 allowances in a 
number equivalent to its portion of the regional cap.”57  The 
state’s allocation decision is subject to the requirement that 
twenty-five percent be set aside “for a consumer benefit or 
 
 53. Coral Davenport, Large Companies Prepared to Pay Price on Carbon, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/business/energy-environment/large-
companies-prepared-to-pay-price-on-carbon.html?_r=0.  Those companies 
included Microsoft, General Electric, Walt Disney, ConAgra Foods, Wells Fargo, 
DuPont, Duke Energy, Google, Delta Air Lines, Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips, 
Chevron, BP and Shell.  Id. 
 54. See infra Part III. 
 55. See Program Design, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.rggi.org/design (last visited June 21, 2014).  The RGGI currently 
includes Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  Id. 
 56. RGGI Executive Summary, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 
2014). 
 57. Id. 
224 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
strategic energy purpose.”58  An independent market monitor 
makes the program self-regulating.59 
Other U.S. programs could be aligned for linkage with 
the RGGI.  California’s recent carbon market linkage with 
Quebec demonstrates that its cap and trade program was 
designed to link with others.60  While the linkage of only two 
markets does not necessarily provide a realistic model of how 
a broader linkage would operate, the results of this linkage 
will likely determine whether other states decide to join 
shared carbon markets.  Additionally, the program design for 
the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord 
(“MRGGRA”), which included six states and the Canadian 
province of Manitoba, was completed in 2010, but 
“participating states are no longer pursuing it.”61  Should the 
former MRGGRA and Western Climate Initiative 
participants62 decide to link their markets with the existing 
California-Quebec and RGGI carbon markets, a substantial 
framework would be created for a broad cap and trade 
program lead and administered by states and provinces.   
Outside the U.S., the European Union’s Emission 
Trading Scheme (“ETS”) serves as an additional model cap 
 
 58. Memorandum of Understanding § 2(G)(1), REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.rggi.org/design/history/mou (noting that 
such a benefit or purpose includes “the use of the allowances to promote energy 
efficiency, to directly mitigate electricity ratepayer impacts, to promote 
renewable or carbon-neutral energy technologies, to stimulate or reward 
investment in the development of innovative carbon emissions abatement 
technologies with significant carbon reduction potential, and/or to fund 
administration.”). 
 59. RGGI Executive Summary, supra note 56 (the market monitor 
“observe[s] the conduct of the auction qualification process and the conduct of 
the auction, and . . . report[s] on whether the auction was conducted in 
accordance with the participating states’ regulations and the noticed auction 
procedures and whether the auction results represented a competitive 
outcome.”). 
 60. See infra Part III.B. 
 61. Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND 
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climate-
initiatives/mggra (last visited June 21, 2014). 
 62. New Mexico, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Montana and Utah were 
also formerly participating but pulled out to join the North America 2050 
Initiative, which they claimed gave states more options to reduce emissions. 6 
States Pull Out of Western Climate Initiative, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Nov. 
22, 2011), 
http://www..sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news..display/id/23178. It 
does not appear that the initiative itself involves additional development of cap 
and trade markets. See About NA2050, NORTH AMERICA 2050, 
http://na2050.org/about/ (last visited June 21, 2014). 
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and trade system.  The ETS utilizes a scaled allowance 
system tailored by industry.63  For example, the 
manufacturing industry received eighty percent of its 
allowances for free in 2013, but that figure will face annual 
reductions until it reaches its thirty percent floor in 2020.64  
This “phased” approach essentially subsidizes industry 
changes, gradually placing a greater burden on the industry 
to secure its allowances by auction.65  However, this approach 
initially resulted in low allowance prices during the first 
phase of the ETS.66  Purchasers may internalize low 
allowance costs by raising prices without actually reducing 
their total emissions. 
Combining the California-Quebec and RGGI markets 
would provide a strong start to a broader multilateral system, 
which could incorporate features from other programs, such 
as the ETS.  International pacts can also be utilized to 
incorporate additional markets by securing foreign states’ 
symbolic commitment.  For example, California, Washington, 
and Oregon recently signed a climate change pact with 
British Columbia stating their intent to implement cap and 
trade programs, strive for zero-emissions vehicles to account 
for ten percent of vehicle purchases in 2016, and achieve long-
term reductions in GHG emissions.67  While non-binding in 
nature,68 this pact represents a commitment to multilateral 
cooperation. Such commitment is necessary to fill the gap left 
by national failures to enact cap and trade programs. 
 
 63. The EU Emissions Trading System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2014). 
 64. Free Allocations Based on Benchmarks, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/index_en.htm (last updated 
June 29, 2014). 
 65. “In 2013 more than 40% of allowances will be auctioned, and this share 
will rise progressively each year[.]”  The EU Emissions Trading System, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm 
(last updated June 29, 2014). 
 66. Chris Wold, et al., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 411 (2d ed. 2013). 
 67. Governor Brown Joins Oregon, Washington, British Columbia Leaders to 
Combat Climate Change, CA.GOV (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18284; Paul Rogers, Climate Change Pact Signed 
by California, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 
29, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_24406734/california-oregon-
washington-and-british-columbia-sign-climate. 
 68. Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy,  PACIFIC COAST 
COLLABORATIVE (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/Documents/Pacific%20Coast%20Climat
e%20Action%20Plan.pdf. 
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM AND 
ANALYSIS: AN UNTENABLE BALANCE 
While federal and state governments may reduce GHG 
emissions using the tools discussed above, such tools are 
unlikely to sufficiently mitigate the effects of climate change. 
Given current resistance to federal legislative and regulatory 
measures to reduce GHG emissions, as discussed in this 
section, states must voluntarily reduce their own emissions.  
A state-lead multilateral cap and trade program is the best 
way to accomplish this, as other regulatory options to reduce 
pollutants are restricted by statutory and constitutional 
considerations. 
A. Political Deadlock Precludes National Cap and Trade 
Political reluctance to enact a national cap and trade 
system is likely due to a combination of general 
misconceptions about climate change and hesitancy to divert 
resources to prevent future, theoretical issues rather than 
contemporary, tangible ones.69  Some politicians, likely either 
hesitant to support additional regulation or pandering to 
their constituents’ skepticism, have made statements that 
oversimplify the issue or conflate weather patterns with 
climate shifts.70  Others emphasize the uncertain nature of 
climate change impacts to justify their inaction.71  Regardless 
 
 69. Perhaps this will change due to recent announcements that the effects of 
climate change are already being felt. See Justin Gillis, U.S. Climate Has 
Already Changed, Study Finds, Citing Heat and Floods, NEW YORK TIMES (May 
6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/science/earth/climate-change-
report.html?_r=0. However, political opposition continues after these 
announcements, such as Senator Mitch McConnell’s statement that “Even if we 
were to enact the kind of national energy regulations the President seems to 
want so badly, it would be unlikely to meaningfully impact global emissions 
anyway unless other major industrial nations do the same thing.” Kevin Liptak 
et. al, Climate Change is Here, Action Needed Now, Says New White House 
Report, CNN.COM (May 6, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/06/politics/white-
house-climate-energy/. 
 70. For example, Minnesota Representative Collin Peterson’s statement, 
“[T]hey’re saying to us, ‘Oh, it’s such a big problem because it’s going to be 
warmer than it usually is.’ My farmers are going to say that’s a good thing - 
we’re going to be able to grow more corn.” Allison Winter, ‘Tough’ Negotiator 
Peterson Rocks Climate Debate, NEW YORK TIMES (June 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/06/17/17greenwire-tough-negotiator-
peterson-rocks-climate-debate-2199.html?pagewanted=all. 
 71. “[T]here is so much we don’t know about this complex field, which is 
made even more difficult by our inability to make predictions and test climate 
hypotheses, except with computer simulations that have questionable 
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of the causes, efforts to establish a nationwide cap and trade 
program have thus far failed72 and the minimal level of 
bipartisan cooperation in the U.S. indicates that this is 
unlikely to change in the near future. 
B. Challenges to EPA Regulation of GHGs 
Litigation attacking the EPA’s regulatory strategy casts 
doubt on the efficacy of using the CAA to regulate GHG 
emissions. 
The Supreme Court recently determined in Utilities Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA73 that the EPA could not “rewrite” 
the CAA by creating the Tailoring Rule, but that the EPA 
could regulate GHG emissions from major stationary sources 
already subject to regulation under the PSD program.74  
Justice Scalia argued that the EPA has traditionally applied 
“a narrower, context-appropriate meaning” to the designation 
of “air pollutant” than the Tailoring Rule’s interpretation.75  
Although GHGs are air pollutants under the CAA, the 
majority opinion notes, the EPA retains discretion to avoid 
regulating GHG emission where doing so would require 
statutory revision.76  Therefore, the EPA could interpret the 
definition of “air pollutant” in the relevant sections of the 
CAA to not include GHG emissions where the program would 
otherwise be “unworkable.”77 
 
assumptions built in.” Rick Santorum, Challenging Science Dogma as with 
Evolution, the ‘Consensus’ on Climate Change has become an Ideology, 
PHILLY.COM (Dec. 17, 2009), http://articles.philly.com/2009-12-
17/news/25269547_1_data-or-testable-theories-global-warming-science-
scientific-consensus. 
 72. Matt Negrin, Whatever Happened to Cap and Trade?, ABC NEWS (July 
17, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/environment-happened-cap-
trade-global-warming/story?id=16790018. 
 73. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (“UARG”) 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 74. Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Rejects EPA’s Rewrite of the Clean 
Air Act, But Greenhouse Gas Regulation Will Go Forward, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (June 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/06/23/scotus-rejects-epas-rewrite-of-the-clean-air-act-but-
ghg-regulation-will-go-forward/. 
 75. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439. 
 76. See id. at 2441 (“Massachusetts [v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497  (2007)]  does not 
strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable 
air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme.”). 
 77. Id. at 2442 (“[T]here is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s 
interpreting ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to 
encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly 
regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants 
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While some justices supported the EPA’s interpretation, 
the majority opinion held that the Tailoring Rule was 
essentially re-writing the CAA.  Although Justice Breyer 
argued that the Tailoring Rule was consistent with the 
purpose of the 250 tpy threshold because “limit[ing] the PSD 
program’s obligations to larger sources while exempting the 
many small sources whose emissions are low enough that 
imposing burdensome regulatory requirements on them 
would be senseless[,]”78 this reasoning was not accepted by 
the majority.  Instead, Justice Scalia’s opinion noted that the 
EPA had overreached its statutory authority by attempting to 
regulate sources that could not reasonably be regulated under 
the express terms of the PSD provision.79 
The majority also took issue with the PSD’s requirement 
for sources to implement “best available control technology” 
(“BACT”).  The majority stated that “[t]here is no indication 
that the Act elsewhere uses, or that EPA has interpreted, 
‘each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter’ to 
mean anything other than what it says,” with regard to 
BACT.80  Finally, the Court distinguished requiring BACT for 
sources already regulated under the PSD to be permissible 
because it would be only a moderate expansion of 
regulation.81  Justice Scalia remarked that the EPA got 
“almost everything it wanted in this case,” since the EPA 
could continue regulating eighty-three percent of GHG-
emitting stationary sources (compared to eighty-six 
percent).82 
The UARG ruling is unlikely to impact the EPA’s recent 
proposed regulations to reduce power plant GHG emissions, 
 
that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their 
inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them 
unworkable as written.”). 
 78. Id. at 2453 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 2446 (noting that “an agency may not rewrite clear statutory 
terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.”). 
 80. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446. 
 81. Id. (noting that “[w]e are not talking about extending EPA jurisdiction 
over millions of previously unregulated entities, but about moderately 
increasing the demands EPA (or a state permitting authority) can make of 
entities already subject to its regulation.”). 
 82. Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Emission Limits on Big Industry, NEW 
YORK TIMES (June 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justices-
with-limits-let-epa-curb-power-plant-
gases.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=LedeSum&module=fi
rst-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0. 
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which would be authorized by section 111(d) of the CAA.83  
However, the proposed 111(d) regulations are likely to open 
the door to a more active state role in regulating GHG 
emissions, including the development of broader multilateral 
cap and trade programs.84 
Alternatively, the EPA could designate combined GHGs 
as a criteria pollutant within the PSD program, but this 
would create other problems.  As the Coalition petitioners 
noted, the EPA must comply with Section 166 of the CAA to 
create National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) 
for criteria pollutants, “including a required study of the 
pollutant and a one-year delay before the effective date of 
regulations.”85  However, even if the EPA attempted to 
designate some or all GHGs as criteria pollutants, states 
could not rely only on the PSD program to whittle down 
American GHG emissions.  As the program establishes 
national goals rather than tailoring them according to each 
region’s capabilities, it does not fully utilize each state’s 
resources. Due to the inherent qualities of GHGs, the CAA is 
simply not the most effective tool to reduce emissions. 
C. Limitations on the EPA’s Authority to Regulate GHGs 
The key difference between GHGs and other CAA-
regulated pollutants exists in the sheer scope of emissions.  
The EPA’s adoption of the Tailoring Rule exemplifies the 
difficulties of regulating GHGs in a feasible manner under 
the CAA.  Although Justice Scalia noted in Utilities Air 
Regulatory Group that EPA would lose its ability to regulate 
only three percent of the sources it intended to,86 the EPA’s 
difficulties in regulating GHG emissions demonstrate that 
the CAA was not adopted with climate change in mind.   
Furthermore, regulating GHG emissions under the PSD 
program is unlikely to advance fast enough to significantly 
mitigate climate change.87 While the EPA can develop its own 
implementation plan if a state fails to submit a plan 
 
 83. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Upholds Rules Curbing Greenhouse 
Gases from Power Plants, LA TIMES (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-supreme-court-power-
plants-20140610-story.html. 
 84. See infra Part III.A. 
 85. Coalition, 684 F.3d at 143. 
 86. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 87. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2436. 
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complying with NAAQS, the EPA must first wait for the 
state’s initial submission and assess its compliance with the 
promulgated standards.88  Since the EPA cannot promulgate 
standards that only some states could attain, such regulation 
fails to realize the potential of states with stronger economies.  
More substantial measures would be needed to sufficiently 
reduce GHG emissions, and the most significant progress 
would likely be accomplished by allowing states to take a 
more active, cooperative role in effectuating reductions.  A 
state-based multilateral cap and trade program would plug 
the gaps in the current system by giving states increased 
flexibility to pursue emissions reductions on a faster 
timescale without adding to the EPA’s burden. 
D. Issues Complicating State Efforts to Fill the Void 
1. CAA Preemption 
The CAA limits state power to independently regulate air 
pollutants, which, by the Massachusetts v. EPA definition, 
include GHG emissions.89  The CAA expressly preempts 
states from regulating vehicle emissions of air pollutants.90  
The EPA, however, retains the discretion to waive the 
statute’s application to California’s vehicle emissions 
standards, provided the state standard is “at least as 
stringent as the comparable applicable Federal standard.”91  
The EPA may deny a waiver request if it finds that the state’s 
determination of equivalency is “arbitrary and capricious,” or 
that the state standard is not necessary “to meet compelling 
and extraordinary conditions,” or that it conflicts with Title 
42, Section 7521(a) of the U.S. Code.92  The outcome turns on 
whether the state action comports with the CAA’s intent as 
shown by its “history and text.”93  The intent behind the 
preemption provision has been interpreted “not to hamstring 
localities in their fight against air pollution but to prevent the 
burden on interstate commerce which would result if, instead 
 
 88. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 28 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
 89. See supra note 1. 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012). 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 93. Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972). 
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of uniform standards, every state and locality were left free to 
impose different standards.”94  Therefore, states are free to 
incorporate vehicle emissions into cap and trade programs, 
provided the action does not effectively force vehicle 
manufacturers to develop different cars for different markets. 
2. Burdening Interstate Commerce 
The Dormant Commerce Clause bars state regulatory 
action that substantially harms interstate commerce unless 
justified by a legitimate state interest that cannot be met by a 
less burdensome alternative.95  “States . . . may not attach 
restrictions to exports or imports in order to control commerce 
in other States.”96  However, if a state law regulates “even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest” and 
affects interstate commerce only incidentally, it “will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”97  
State legislation can affect commerce without violating the 
Commerce Clause, provided it does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce.98  Regulating some interstate 
commercial activity is not discriminatory per se.99 
The Commerce Clause affords states considerable 
regulatory flexibility, even in the context of widely-dispersed 
pollutants, such as GHGs.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 
Corey100 recently explored the boundary between affecting 
interstate commerce and burdening it.  There, the plaintiffs 
contended that the CAA’s Renewable Fuel Standard101 
(“RFS”) preempted the California Air Resources Board’s 
(“CARB”) Low Carbon Fuel Standard102 (“LCFS”) and violated 
the Commerce Clause.103  The LCFS set an annual limit on 
the “carbon intensity” of fuel consumed within California and 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). 
 96. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393 
(1994). 
 97. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 98. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). 
 99. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (“The 
fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies 
does not . . . establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.”). 
 100. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012). 
 102. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, §§ 95480–90 (West 2014). 
 103. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1077. 
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allowed fuel producers that exceeded the limit to offset excess 
with “credits” purchased from other producers in the manner 
of a cap and trade program.104  Carbon intensity was 
measured by “lifecycle analysis,” which factored in “all 
aspects of the production, refining, and transportation of a 
fuel” to reduce GHGs emitted in its production.105 
The challengers argued that the LCFS discriminated 
against ethanol produced out-of-state.106  Fuels incorporating 
ethanol produced out-of-state tended to have higher carbon 
intensity since the ethanol was often created in less efficient 
facilities that relied on electricity from coal-fueled power 
plants.107  The challengers also argued that the LCFS 
disadvantaged crude oil, which did not include ethanol and 
therefore could not take advantage of the carbon offset 
provided by growing crops used to produce ethanol.108  
Further, CARB’s 2011 provision established that “no crude oil 
could be assessed a carbon intensity below the market 
average, but newer sources causing higher emissions were 
assessed at their individual carbon intensity,” leaving crude 
oil producers no alternative to meeting the LCFS except for 
“supplying alternative fuels or buying credits from the sellers 
of alternative fuels.”109 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the LCFS 
did not facially violate the Commerce Clause or discriminate 
in purpose or effect against out-of-state crude oil producers 
and remanded the case to the district court “to consider 
whether the LCFS’s ethanol provisions discriminate in 
purpose or in practical effect.”110  The court differentiated this 
case from cases that found a discriminatory purpose111 by 
concluding that no sufficient basis existed for finding 
differential treatment resulting from discrimination.112  The 
 
 104. Id. at 1080. 
 105. Id. at 1081. 
 106. Id. at 1086. 
 107. Id. at 1083. 
 108. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1084–86. 
 109. Id. at 1085. 
 110. Id. at 1078. 
 111. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality of State of 
Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994) (reasoning that discrimination was origin-based 
where out-of-state waste was no more harmful or costly than instate waste); 
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding an Alabama 
law as discriminatory for imposing import fees on out-of-state waste where 
there was no association between place of origin and risk to Alabama). 
 112. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1089. 
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court determined, therefore, that “if an out-of-state ethanol 
pathway does impose higher costs on California by virtue of 
its greater GHG emissions, there is a nondiscriminatory 
reason for its higher carbon intensity value.”113 
Although the challengers argued that origin was 
“inextricably intertwined” with transportation and electricity 
sources’ contribution to carbon intensity, the court responded 
that “[u]nless and until either the United States Supreme 
Court or the Congress forbids it, California is entitled to 
proceed on the understanding that global warming is being 
induced by rising carbon emissions and attempt to change 
that trend.”114  The court clarified that states cannot regulate 
“wholly out-of-state transactions,” but are not barred from 
regulating “within their boundaries with the goal of 
influencing the out-of-state choices of market participants.”115  
The court also noted that out-of-state producers had 
alternatives to reduce their carbon intensity and “the 
dormant Commerce Clause does not guarantee that ethanol 
producers may compete on the terms they find most 
convenient.”116  The regulation’s specified purpose justified 
the LCFS factors.117  Furthermore, the LCFS factors were not 
discriminatory “because they reflect[ed] the reality of 
assessing and attempting to limit GHG emissions from 
ethanol production.”118  The court noted that while the LCFS 
did have “incidental effects on interstate commerce,” it did 
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because “it does 
not control conduct wholly outside the state.”119 
Along similar lines, California’s Senate Bill 1368 set an 
emissions standard for power contracts and baseload 
generation at 1,100 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour—the 
emissions rate of a combined-cycle gas turbine power plant.120  
 
 113. Id. at 1089–90. 
 114. Id. at 1090. 
 115. Id. at 1103. 
 116. Id. at 1091–92 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 
(1978)). 
 117. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1091 (justifying the transportation 
factor with the regulation’s specified purpose of measuring real differences in 
the harmful effects of ethanol production). 
 118. Id. at 1093. 
 119. Id. at 1106. 
 120. Power Sector, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/tracking/individual/ca.html (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
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The law seems susceptible to challenges alleging that it 
unduly burdens interstate commerce “[s]ince most of the 
generation that exceeds that standard is located outside 
California.”121  However, the California Public Utilities 
Commission determined that any burden was “incidental and 
not clearly excessive in relation to the substantial local 
benefits of the [Emissions Performance Standard].”122 
It remains unclear, however, whether future Commerce 
Clause challenges to state actions touching on sources in 
other states are foreclosed. Refusing to abandon their 
Commerce Clause challenge to California’s LCFS, the Rocky 
Mountain petitioners requested an en banc hearing,123 which 
the Ninth Circuit denied.124  Judge Gould’s concurrence 
clearly supported the prior determination, affirming that 
“California is free to regulate commerce within its borders 
even if it has an ancillary goal of influencing the choices of 
actors in other states.”125  In remanding the determination of 
whether the LCFS discriminated in purpose or effect against 
out-of-state-commerce to the lower court, Judge Gould was 
careful to point out that the court had not actually upheld the 
LCFS, but rather remanded due to finding that it did not 
“facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce,” 
remanding to the lower court the determination of whether 
the LCFS discriminated in purpose or effect against out-of-
state commerce.126  Finally, Judge Gould restated that “as 
long as there is ‘some reason, apart from their origin, to treat 
them differently,’ California may distinguish between 
Midwestern, Brazilian, and California ethanols.”127  The 
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 123. Mica Rosenberg, Case to Watch: California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
on Appeal, REUTERS LEGAL (Jan. 6, 2014), 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I526d0c4076c511e38089abd4e0a44763/Vi
ew/FullText.html?transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=%28sc.Defa
ult%29. 
 124. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 508 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
 125. Id. at 509. 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 510 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)). 
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subsequent petition for certiorari was recently denied.128 
For the moment, states appear confident in pursuing 
similar fuel standards, which would help support a 
multilateral cap and trade program.  For example, the 
governors of Washington and Oregon are apparently 
contemplating executive orders to implement a LCFS in their 
respective states.129 
3. Multilateral Agreement Limitations 
Regional climate change programs may run afoul of other 
barriers, including the foreign affairs powers granted to the 
federal government130 and the U.S. Constitution’s Compact 
Clause, which prohibits states from “enter[ing] into any 
agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign 
power” without congressional consent.131  The prohibition 
against state involvement in foreign affairs generally applies 
only when states “set up their own authorities as mini-state-
departments, with power to oversee and either approve or 
disapprove foreign regimes or the negotiation efforts of the 
U.S. Executive Branch . . . .”132  The Commerce Clause 
precludes multilateral agreements that “may encroach on or 
interfere with” the federal government’s authority.133  
Permissible multilateral agreements, therefore, must not give 
states additional power, surrender any state power, or coerce 
other states.134 
 
 128. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 34 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (denying 
petition for certiorari to Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 
1070 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
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Massachusetts recognized that state power to regulate 
GHG emissions may be limited by foreign policy 
considerations.  The Court noted that a state “cannot 
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in 
some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce 
in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.”135  
In the context of corporate average fuel economy standards’ 
federal regulation, the court in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep 
v. Witherspoon found that state regulation in that area, when 
disruptive to foreign policy, is preempted regardless of 
waiver.136  The district court held that challengers of a state 
regulation had “stated a claim for preemption of the 
regulations based on foreign policy” by showing that the 
regulations could undermine “the Executive’s ability to 
pursue such agreements.”137  It is possible, however, that 
changes in U.S. foreign policy could moot such matters.138  
Furthermore, since the decision was merely “a preliminary 
decision on a motion for judgment on the pleading. . . . Any 
statements . . . that go beyond the adequacy of the pleadings 
are purely dicta.”139 
It appears that state GHG regulation is now consistent 
with U.S. foreign policy.  The Green Mountain Chrysler 
Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie court recently noted that 
the State Department acknowledged the regulation of GHG 
emissions as an “important factor in the success of GHG 
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emission reduction policies.”140  Further, the EPA recently 
stated that it “support[ed] and recognize[d] the success and 
necessity of State programs as a vital component in achieving 
GHG emissions reductions, particularly those focused on 
energy efficiency improvements.”141  President Obama has 
also issued a memorandum reinforcing the principle that 
“preemption of State law by executive departments and 
agencies should be undertaken only with full consideration of 
the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient 
legal basis for preemption.”142  The EPA has also noted that 
Executive Order 13132 requires “agencies [to] construe 
federal statutes as preempting state law or issue regulations 
authorizing preemption only where the statute contains an 
express preemption provision, there is clear evidence that 
Congress intended to preempt state law, or the exercise of 
state authority conflicts with the exercise of federal 
authority.”143  Since the EPA’s proposed regulations pursuant 
to section 111(d) of the CAA recognize the legitimacy of 
regional cap and trade programs and Congress is unlikely to 
develop a comprehensive cap and trade law, state-
administered cap and trade programs linked with foreign 
governments do not conflict with the federal foreign affairs 
power. 
III. PROPOSAL: PROMOTING A LARGE-SCALE MULTILATERAL 
CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM 
A. The EPA’s Role 
Given the EPA’s role in regulating GHG emissions, cap 
and trade programs will likely succeed where their goals 
align with the EPA’s programs.  It is unclear whether the 
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EPA has authority under the CAA to create a cap and trade 
program for GHGs. While the EPA has already implemented 
a cap and trade program for the gases SO2 and NOx,144 such 
gases are criteria pollutants which are regulated under a 
different section of the CAA.145  Therefore, it appears unlikely 
that the EPA has the statutory authority to pursue a similar 
program for GHGs.  Alternatively, some suggest the EPA 
could emphasize the role of interstate cooperation and 
multilateral programs in its NAAQs guidance to states.146 
In a similar manner, the EPA recently took a significant 
step to encourage states to use cap and trade programs.  The 
EPA’s proposed section 111(d) regulations147 will likely 
encourage additional linkage between existing cap and trade 
programs.  These regulations would require the power sector 
to increase efficiency, utilize opportunities for lower-emitting 
generation, and reduce demand148 in order to cut its 2005 CO2 
emissions-levels by thirty percent by 2030.149  According to 
the EPA, the regulations would produce substantial health 
and climate benefits while retaining coal and natural gas as 
the primary power plant fuels.150  The EPA would create 
state-specific CO2 reduction goals and states would 
independently or cooperatively develop plans to meet such 
milestones.151  Specifically mentioning existing cap and trade 
programs as a vehicle through which states could meet their 
 
 144. Cap and Trade Programs, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/captrade/programs.html (last visited June 21, 2014). 
 145. The EPA’s interpretation that the GHG endangerment finding 
automatically triggered the PSD program relies on Section 165 of the CAA, 
which is not tied to Section 166’s requirements.  See Coalition, 684 F.3d at 143–
44.  The EPA’s interpretation that the Tailpipe Rule automatically triggered the 
PSD program relies on Section 165 of the CAA, which is not tied to Section 166’s 
requirements.  Id. at 115, 143. 
 146. Dallas Burtraw et. al., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DP 13-04, LINKING 
BY DEGREES, INCREMENTAL ALIGNMENT OF CAP-AND-TRADE MARKETS 3 (2013), 
available at 
http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=2
2167/. 
 147. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 117 34,829 
(June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Electric NSPS]. 
 148. Id. at 34,852. 
 149. Id. at 34,832. 
 150. The EPA anticipates these regulations will produce “net climate and 
health benefits of $48 billion to $82 billion,” while “coal and natural gas would 
remain the two leading sources of electricity generation in the U.S., with each 
providing more than 30 percent of the projected generation.”  Id. 
 151. Id. at 34,833. 
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reduction goals,152 the regulations strengthen the possibility 
of broader multijurisdictional programs.  By endorsing 
cooperative cap and trade programs as a viable option to 
attain reductions, the proposed regulations provide the 
impetus for reluctant states to join in a broad, state-
administered cap and trade program. 
B. Multilateral Mechanics 
Pre-existing cap and trade programs can function as 
platforms to build linked cap and trade programs, but 
differences between these programs may complicate linkage.  
To bridge the gap between existing programs, some have 
proposed making incremental changes, or “linking by 
degrees.”153  Such a process would allow states to gradually 
align their programs with others before committing to a 
linkage, allowing them to continue pursuing reductions and 
integrate the most successful attributes of their programs 
into the joint program. 
The existing California cap and trade program could 
function as a framework for a multilateral agreement.  The 
program, developed with the input of the RGGI architects,154 
has already begun linking with other markets.155  Although 
California and Quebec intentionally designed their programs 
with compatibility in mind,156 the differences between the 
markets show that cap and trade programs need not be 
perfectly synchronized (although differences may create price 
differentials).157  While the linkage is in its early stages, the 
 
 152. Electric NSPS, 79 Fed. Reg. at 117, 34,834. 
 153. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 1. 
 154. Id. at 3. 
 155. Id. at 4 (“California and RGGI already are linking by degrees through 
cooperation and sharing of information, mutual learning and borrowing from 
each other’s program design.”). 
 156. California ARB to Link Carbon Market with Quebec, MCGUIRE WOODS 
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-
Resources/Alerts/2013/4/California-ARB-to-Link-Carbon-Market-with-
Quebec.aspx. 
 157. See California Amends Cap and Trade Regulation to Link to Quebec, 
EVOLUTION MARKETS (May 10, 2012), 
http://www.evomarkets.com/desks/carbon_ca/post/5885 (“A key difference 
between Quebec and California is the surrender obligations between the two 
programs. California entities are required to surrender 30% of the annual 
obligation each year leading up to a true up at the end of the compliance period.  
This will lead to a drawing down of supply from the market by California 
entities over the compliance period. In Quebec, entities have until the end of the 
compliance period to surrender their full obligations.  Additionally, California’s 
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future looks positive: while Quebec’s initial carbon allowance 
auction158 had fairly low sales of future allowances, most 
future allowances were purchased at the auction following the 
official announcement of the linkage.159 
While programs do not need to be exactly aligned to 
successfully link, “program elements that are not aligned 
could have important distributional or environmental 
consequences or generally contradict the founding principles 
of one of the constituent programs.”160  Generally, there are a 
few key areas that a broad, multilateral cap and trade 
program would have to address. 
Preventing participating jurisdictions’ goals from being 
undermined requires aligning each program’s market 
stringency, offset policies, price floors and  ceilings, and 
procedures for program changes and de-linkage as closely as 
possible.  Some have suggested that large discrepancies 
between price allowances in participating markets can be 
addressed by implementing an “exchange rate” for allowances 
purchased in a linked market.161  Essentially, a state with 
higher-priced allowances could make a certain number of 
allowances purchased in a lower-priced market equivalent to 
one of its own allowances and reevaluate that number 
according to a particular schedule or pre-established 
formula.162  To avoid losing the power to choose the sorts of 
offsets that could be used in a particular cap and trade 
program, states can “impose import quotas, fees, or discount 
 
offset system will retain provisions related to invalidation of offsets, whereby 
Quebec’s program will not.  This could lead to differentiation of pricing across 
Quebec and California offsets in the bilateral markets.”); see also Burtraw, 
supra note 146, at 27–31 (discussing that linkage between California and the 
RGGI is possible, despite differences in sector focus and emissions caps). 
 158. Cap and trade programs typically allow carbon allowances to be 
purchased on a quarterly basis through government-run auctions. In California, 
for example, the state and utility companies within the state may sell 
allowances to emit CO2 for the current year or future years. See California Cap 
and Trade Updates, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, 
http://www.edf.org/california-cap-and-trade-updates (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).  
Emitters of threshold levels of CO2 may purchase those allowances to meet their 
compliance obligations.  See id. 
 159. Gloria Gonzalez, Quebec’s Carbon Market Rebounds After California 
Hook Up, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id
=10242. 
 160. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 11. 
 161. Id. at 28. 
 162. Id. 
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rates” on undesirable offsets.163  However, differing standards 
on offsets creates a “free-up effect,” meaning that offsets 
prohibited in one jurisdiction would be largely available in 
those that permitted them.164 Therefore, the policy goals of 
each party are best effectuated by reaching consensus on 
offset eligibility. Additionally, maintaining investor 
confidence in the market requires trigger prices for the floor 
and ceiling to coincide.165  Finally, “[t]he contingencies should 
be anticipated by each jurisdiction to provide reassurance to 
investors and legislatures.”166  Participating states could 
further counteract the possibility of leakage167 by enacting 
other regulation in tandem, such as California’s previously-
discussed low carbon fuel standard.168 
C. Convincing States to Sign On 
One of the greatest benefits provided by a multilateral 
state-based program is that it could yield substantial results 
even if only the largest-emitting states participated.  In fact, 
a program incorporating the top five GHG-emitting states 
would address approximately one-third of total U.S. 
emissions.169  Such a program should be fiscally appealing, as 
it would produce increased revenue for states without raising 
taxes.170  Additionally, a variety of incentives could be offered 
 
 163. Id. at 29. 
 164. Id. at 28–29. 
 165. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 29 (“Different trigger prices for the floor 
and ceiling will influence allowance flows and prices and there also is a strong 
potential for differing floors to erode the environmental integrity of the linked 
programs. If they are not aligned, linking could undermine the value of previous 
investments and thereby the confidence of investors going forward.”). 
 166. Id. at 30. 
 167. “[A]chieving noticeable benefit from reducing emissions requires a 
significant undertaking that exceeds the reach of any one program especially in 
light of the fundamental free rider characteristic of the climate policy 
challenge.”  Id. at 2. 
 168. “[C]ompetitiveness and leakage concerns might be ameliorated via an 
independent and parallel program that introduced a price on emissions either 
through cap and trade, a tax or some types of regulations.”  Id. at 9. 
 169. Based on 2010 data, the U.S. emitted 5,661.79 MtCO₂e of GHGs, of 
which Texas, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois accounted for 1,918.85 
MtCO₂e (over 33.89%). WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, Climate Analysis 
Indicators Tool, 
http://cait2.wri.org/wri/US%20State%20GHG%20Emissions?indicator[]=Total%
20GHG%20Emissions%20Excluding%20LUCF&indicator[]=Total%20GHG%20
Emissions%20Including%20LUCF&year[]=2010&chartType=geo (last visited 
June 21, 2014). 
 170. “After six auctions, [California’s cap and trade] program has generated 
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to convince states with diverging interests to take part in a 
multilateral cap and trade program and link existing 
markets. 
First, participating states—by giving their businesses an 
incentive to adopt clean technology—would be leading the 
way in technological development and increasing economic 
competitiveness.  Encouraging states to invest in such 
technologies and reduce their manufacturing costs would 
reduce the price gap between renewable and traditional 
energy.171  Using the market to make renewable technologies 
more attractive would ultimately allow the benefits of 
renewable energy to be more widespread,172 creating greater 
demand and benefitting states containing industry associated 
with such technologies. 
Additionally, participation in a widespread program 
would signal a more united front and reinforce the image of 
strong commitment to further climate change mitigation 
efforts.173  Further, a more uniform system would reduce both 
administration and compliance costs.174 Therefore, business 
entities required to participate in cap and trade programs 
would likely prefer a more uniform, predictable system to a 
patchwork one.175 
Moreover, states with less economic power could benefit 
 
$663 million for the state so far, according to the California Air Resources 
Board. [California State Senator] Steinberg’s office projects the permits could 
soon bring in $3 billion to $5 billion a year.” Jeremy B. White, Steinberg Plan 
Would Dedicate California Cap-and-Trade Dollars to Housing, Transit, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2014/04/steinberg-proposes-california-
cap-and-trade.html. 
 171. See U.S. Department of Energy, Photovoltaics: Technologies, Cost, and 
Performance, (Feb.  2012), available at  
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/47927_chapter4.pdf (“[R]educing the 
price of [photovoltaic] systems by about 75% by 2020—is projected to make 
[them] competitive with conventional sources on a levelized cost of energy 
(LCOE) basis.”). 
 172. See id. (“Achieving this electricity price parity is projected to result in 
large-scale U.S. deployment of [photovoltaic] technologies, which would meet 
11% of contiguous U.S. electricity demand in 2030 and 19% in 2050 . . . .”). 
 173. “The incremental alignment of program elements and the prospect of 
formal linking contribute a political benefit because they signal progress toward 
greater levels of cooperation necessary to achieve significant scale across 
jurisdictions.” Burtraw, supra note 146, at 2. 
 174. Id. at 2–3. 
 175. “[B]oth formal and incremental linking help reduce the costs for 
regulated business by reducing the uncertainty they face in the development of 
different trading programs.”  Id. at 2. 
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from offset projects styled on Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”) and REDD+ projects.176  These states could commit 
to a “unilateral” linkage, which functions as an “exporting” 
market of allowances that the other market “imports” as 
offsets.177  These projects would provide low-cost offsets while 
allowing market forces to help states with smaller economies 
gradually adopt cleaner or more efficient technology and 
infrastructure or retain more forest land.  For example, CDM-
style projects could address domestic improvements, such as 
upgrading railroad systems and updating the electric grid to 
increase electric power distribution efficiency.  Giving states 
an incentive to preserve their forests also provides an 
alternative to developing those areas.  Further, introducing 
cheaper allowances provides for mitigation gains at less cost, 
ultimately increasing the efficiency of the GHG reductions 
achieved.178  Such projects would change the nature of the 
program to be more akin to an infrastructure investment 
than a tax, which could in turn increase public support.179 
While states would retain the ability to withdraw from 
the agreement—as New Jersey did from the RGGI—
withdraw would not prove fatal to the system.180  Further, the 
previously-discussed benefits provided by a widespread cap 
and trade program would likely make continued participation 
a logical course of action. 
CONCLUSION 
A broad, state-administered, multilateral cap and trade 
 
 176. REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation), which is intended to fund forest preservation, remains a 
controversial policy for various reasons.  See Chris Lang, Debate: Should 
California Cap and Trade Use Forestry Offsets?, REDD-MONITOR.ORG (May 21, 
2013), http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/05/21/debate-should-california-cap-
and-trade-use-forestry-offsets/. 
 177. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 5. 
 178. Id. at 32. 
 179. In 2009, about fifty percent of Americans supported cap and trade and 
eleven percent were “unsure.”  Pew Research Center, Cap & Trade: Few Know 
What it is but Half Support the Idea, (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/cap-trade-few-know-what-it-is-but-
half-support-the-idea/. 
 180. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 30.  The RGGI continues operating despite 
New Jersey’s withdrawal.  See Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From 
10-State Climate Initiative, NEW YORK TIMES (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/nyregion/christie-pulls-nj-from-greenhouse-
gas-coalition.html?_r=0. 
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program provides states with the flexibility they need to more 
aggressively mitigate climate change without subjecting them 
to litigation or worrying about other states undercutting their 
efforts.  While aligning programs sufficiently to preserve the 
efficiency benefits of a cap and trade program requires states 
to compromise with each other, such compromises should be 
manageable without sacrificing the policies each state seeks 
to advance.  Existing cap and trade programs provide a 
framework for other states to follow, and their success has 
established investor confidence that should carry on to a more 
widely-linked system.  As it is unlikely a cap and trade 
program will be implemented on a federal level, states have 
the responsibility to join in their own program, preserving a 
high level of control over the system while benefitting directly 
from the resulting revenue. 
